EDITORIAL

Voices under the radar

I dare say that the UNU Peace and Progress has never been this ambitious yet since its inception in 2013. For one, the journal only reopened its doors for publication this year following a two-year hiatus (the last issue was published in 2016). In the months leading to this publication’s release, the Board also produced a total of three bi-monthly Transforming Our World newsletters relating to each of UNU’s thematic clusters for 2015 to 2019: Peace and Governance (Jan-Feb 2019); Global Development and Inclusion (Mar-Apr 2019); and Environment, Climate, and Energy (May-Jun 2019).

The decision to produce both journal and newsletter publications resulted in amendments to the UPP’s original organizational structure. Whereas there were only the EIC and Editors in the previous Boards, this year saw the development of more distinct roles fitted to the Board’s growing mandate. The UPP website, meanwhile, was given a fresher, more modern spin to adapt to changes in today’s design and digital trends.

No less significant among these accomplishments is the reestablishment of partnership with the UNU-MERIT in Maastricht, The Netherlands—a UNU campus involved in journal operations in 2015 but has not been represented in the Editorial Board since. To ensure that the partnership run sustainably, our Board Members from UNU-MERIT helped incorporate UPP responsibilities in their charter for DEMOS, the study association of students of the M.Sc. in Public Policy and Human Development program at UNU-MERIT.

Finally, this year’s journal issue is also set to launch at the inaugural, student-led Sustainability Research Symposium 2019 at the UNU Headquarters in Tokyo, Japan on July 4. A first in its brief history, this launch was conceived in the hopes of gaining a wider reach for the journal and encouraging more academics and researchers to submit for publication.

In light of these recent changes and triumphs, it is helpful—even paramount—to look back at the motivations behind the foundation of the UPP in 2013. While the UPP has undergone transformations over the years, its core remains to be inspired by the Charter of the United Nations University and its mandate: to solve the “pressing global problems of human survival, development, and welfare” (Article 1, Paragraph 2) and disseminate knowledge for “dynamic
interaction” (Article 1, Paragraph 4). It is precisely this rationale that makes the UPP unique; it seeks to address global issues that are salient to today’s realities.

In recent years we have seen a renewed focus on the human dimensions of sustainability—from growing discussions on the protection of climate migrants to the involvement of women in political decision-making processes. This is the phenomenon that the current issue reflects: guided by UNU’s thematic clusters, the one research paper and two commentaries comprising this issue revolves around the themes of ethno-nationality and conflict, refugee crisis, and women empowerment. Weidinger’s work examines the role of ethno-nationality on voting preferences in Northern Ireland, and found that ethno-nationally minded voters are more moderate—as opposed to extremist—in their voting decisions where these choices relate to the more distant UK level of governance, and less moderate during regional elections where the level of governance concerned is closer to the conflict. Pozzato’s commentary studies the current state of refugees vis-à-vis Agamben’s theory of Homo Sacer, and argues for the development of a new legal rights system for refugee protection. Under the Global Development and Inclusion cluster, van Wijgerden critically analyzes Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) targeted at women, and calls for a transformative approach to social protection grounded on the concept of human rights.

All these works have one thing in common: they interrogate the politics of conflict and inequality amongst marginalized sectors. While these are issues that are best debated upon by our leaders in their wide-reaching government platforms, Pozzato, Weidinger, and van Wijgerden—who are all public policy students at the time of writing their respective articles—prove that the academe is an equally viable venue for innovative ideas to flourish. This is exactly what this issue of the UPP offers at its core: a platform to demonstrate that the youth are still in a formidable position to make an impact at the policy landscape. After all, it is high time that young voices—those echoing from the four corners of the classroom—be sought and heard.

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Ethno-National Confrontation and Electoral Choice: Local and National Voting under Northern Ireland’s ‘Unlikely Constitutional Consensus’

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ABSTRACT

Ethnic conflicts are at the heart of many security concerns worldwide. Often, they are addressed through constitutional engineering whereby electoral institutions are designed to disperse conflict potential. However, some of these institutional designs accommodate societal conflict rather than resolving it. This paper analyses the functioning of such a design in Northern Ireland. The impact of ethno-nationality on voting preferences, as an indicator of societal strive, is the key relationship under consideration. I formulate the assumption that party-preferences in Northern Ireland are unevenly distributed on the semantic ethnonational (unionist/nationalist) issue dimension. While political parties thereon are clearly demarcated, the ideational distances between them vary considerably relative to the ‘centrist’ position. This translates into different levels of moderatism/extremism among parties. The model presented tests this hypothesis as a matter of revealed valuation through voting. Odds ratios of party-voting by ethno-nationality are estimated using multinomial logit. To account for variation between governance levels, the model compares voting decisions in both local and national (UK) elections. The findings suggest that ethno-nationally minded voters are more moderate in their choices, where these choices concern the more distant UK level of governance and less moderate during regional elections, where the level of governance concerned is more immediate to the conflict itself.

KEYWORDS: conflict, ethnonationality, voting, multi-level governance, Northern Ireland

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I. INTRODUCTION

How to best allocate latent conflict-potential and promote integration via the electoral process is of great relevance to many societies. This is certainly so in Europe, where long-served democracies face repeated revolt from secessionist movements, either at national level (towards the European Union (EU)) or intra-nationally (like Catalunya and the Basque Country in Spain or Northern Ireland and Scotland in the UK). In the highly salient case of Northern Ireland, there are unusually many options for these dynamics to unfold.

The Northern Irish electorate participates in three major types of periodically reoccurring elections, each referring delegates to a different level of governance (regional/Northern Irish, national/British, and supra-national/European). While scholarly attention on the ever-shifting power-ratios in the conflict between Irish nationalists, and pro-British unionists, and non-sectarians accumulates, their fate under either of the voting systems used in Northern Ireland remains contested (Coakley & Fraenkel, 2017). More so, there is virtually no literature on the implications of different voting systems being used in a plural society like Northern Ireland in the context of regional and national elections.

The Northern Irish case with its clear demarcation between conflicting groups and the longevity of those structures is particularly well-suited for testing. This essay explores how voting choices in Northern Ireland are conditioned by group affiliation. Quantifying the strength and directionality of these effects on local Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA) and general (UK) elections gives valuable insight into how incentives change with the application of different voting rules at different levels of governance. The findings suggest a dispersion of conflict in national elections compared to regional ones.

Mending previous to models of ethno-national voting (e.g., Fraenkel & Grofman, 2004; Coakley & Fraenkel, 2010), this paper assumes asymmetrical distribution of ideology along a one-dimensional semantic issue dimension; while parties are clearly demarcated and perceived as either nationalist, unionist, or neither, the ideational distances between them are not symmetric to a centrist’s position. This asymmetry translates into different levels of moderatism or extremism among parties. The model presented tests this hypothesis as a matter of revealed valuation through voting. Estimates of voting likelihoods by ethno-nationality are obtained using multinomial logistic regression. The findings, based on survey data (Tonge, 2010, 2015, 2017), reveal both the directionality and strength of ethno-nationality’s influence on party choice.
The aim is to (1) arrive at a quantitative estimate of where voters position the parties on the ethno-national issue dimension and to (2) see whether or not voting behaviour in deeply divided Northern Ireland differs with regards to the two levels of governance, the NIA and the UK parliament. Following a comprehensive section on the state of the art, the analytical framework is introduced. It covers the theoretical and conceptual operationalisation. Therafter, data and methods are disclosed. Results are interpreted in detail in the discussion. Eventually, a brief summary of the findings, a hint at limitations, and some suggestions for future research are offered.

II. STATE OF THE ART

The ethno-national continuum in Northern Ireland runs from radical nationalist to radical unionist, where the midpoint corresponds to a non-sectarian position. The ideological dimension of the Northern Irish conflict stems from a society, divided in multiple ways (Grofman & Fraenkel, 2008; Coakley & Fraenkel, 2010, 2017; Evans & Tonge, 2013; Elliott, 2009; McGarry & O'Leary, 2004, 2009; Mitchell, 2001, 2007, 2012, 2014). Cleavages pertinent to religious denomination, schooling, or housing (Evans & Tonge, 2013) overlap and streamline into what Eckstein (1966) termed a “segmental cleavage” (p.34; see also Zuckerman, 1975); one that, by its ubiquity, divides society into competing, autonomously functioning groups.

When many widely scoped cleavages coincide perfectly with one another over time to form a segmentation of society, “[t]he man on the other side…soon becomes an enemy” (Dahl, 1967, p. 277, see also Axelrod, 1970, p.158-160). Because such static division gives little room for further integration among or differentiation from either group (Horowitz, 1993b, 175), party politics in such societies tend unfold along the same fault lines (Horowitz, 1993b, p.174). This description of mutually reinforcing divisions is reflected in Northern Ireland.

A. Socio-political institutions and divisions in Northern Ireland

While ethno-religious nationalism has marked Northern Ireland for centuries, its reinforced institutional character was written into the Belfast Agreement of 1998.2 Celebrated as the basis of peace, the treaty also solidified the party-political dichotomy between Unionists and Nationalists. This is evident in the fact that elected officials must declare themselves as ‘Nationalist’, ‘Unionist’, or ‘Others’. The major ethno-national parties include Sinn Fein (Gaeilge for “ourselves”, SF) and the SocialDemocratic and Labour Party (SDLP) for Irish

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2 Otherwise known as the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ (GFA) - for the legal provisions pertinent to this discussion, consult the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Strand one on Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland.
nationalists and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) for unionists.

There is a relatively recent presence of parties which either run more inclusive agendas or focus on other neutral issues (e.g. environmentalism). The inability to genuinely frame oneself in non-conflicting terms, say, ‘feminist’ or ‘socialist’, causes great disenchantment among non-sectarian political figures (Green Party representative, personal communication, February 15, 2018). This is only one of many examples of rigid checks and securities that seem to cause inefficiencies in the delivery of democratic governance.

Another one, the condition to ‘power-share’ for devolution, implies that both ethnonationalities must coalesce in the NIA. This does not only prevent one group from dominating over the other, but also precludes the blocs from coalescing with non-sectarian parties. Concurrently, the two highest executive positions must be chosen one each from the two conflicting groups. The constitutional arrangement, hence, implicitly assumes persisting segmentation for the future and constructs government upon ethnic plurality (see Nagle & Clancy, 2012, p.93; O’Leary, 1998).

B. Constitutional engineering and voting systems in theory

The institutions described are in line with the theory of Consociationalism. This theory is based on the premise that divided peoples are resilient “to assimilate, fuse, or dissolve into one common identity” (McGarry & O’Leary, 2009, p.26). Societal strife is conceptualised as an intractable conflict (Horowitz, 1993b, p.173; Rein & Schön, 1994). Accordingly, total conflict-resolution by favourably altering the institutional framework is deemed unattainable. Instead, appeasement and institutionalisation of societal divisions is sought. To that end, consociationalists promote proportional power-sharing. What follows is “government by elite cartel...to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart, 1969, p.216). This favours grand coalition government, proportional representation (PR), ethnic self-reliance, and mutual veto rights (Lijphart, 1969, 1977, 1991, 1996; Nagle & Clancy, 2012, p.82). Built-in assurances like these tend to build sticky institutions which, as in Northern Ireland, prove increasingly difficult to alteration (see Horowitz, 2014).

Suppose identity was less deterministic as consociationalism posits and conflict resolution through social transformation was possible. For some scholars, identity is a form of ideational ‘incarceration’ (Sen, 2006) that can be appeased by means of aligning the interests of the conflicting groups. Because alignment is sought through moderation towards a centrist position, the pertinent theoretical strand is dubbed ‘centripetalism’. This theory promotes majority rule
rather than PR to prevent institutionalised segmentation. Less ethnically deterministic variants of representation serve as a platform for “bottom-up transformative processes located at the level of civil society and designed to encourage intergroup reconciliation” and stratification towards other issue-dimensions (Nagle & Clancy, 2012, p.83). In that sense, Centripetalism takes direct issue with the rigid corporatist frameworks of Lijphart’s (1969) ‘government by elite cartel’. The dispersion or concentration of opposed interests are of crucial relevance to social conflicts. As we have seen, consociationalism postulates that a stronger concentration of interests leads to compartmentalised representation and strong negotiation positions for the constituent groups. Centripetalists, on the other hand, posit that dispersion of conflicting interests mitigates strife more effectively. Both states can be achieved by different means in a democratic system, but the potential of the electoral process to mitigate conflict is emphasised in the literature (for a post-electoral approach, see Axelrod, 1970, pp. 152-153). Electoral rules are, thus, of major importance in divided societies.


“The presence of vote-pooling institutions may encourage the development of this type of moderate core…. But it cannot invent moderation where none exists” (Reilly, 2004, p.16). Hence, consociationalists’ premise that segmental cleavages are per se intractable. The more common variants of PR (see Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2011) function on basis of party list voting and put little emphasis on candidate-voting. Lijphart promotes these electoral regimes (1977, 1991, 1996, 1997) which he claims maximise “the power and flexibility of segmental leaders” (1977, p.137). List-PR provides for grand coalitions and renders self-representation for ethnically distinct constituencies. This yields a concentration of conflicting interests and a compartmentalisation of political representation. Both consociationalism and centripetalism deal with the “familiar aversion of ethnic majorities to limits...to unfettered ethnic majority
rule” (Horowitz, 2014, p.10). The stiff consociational templates of minority representation may seem less assailable than centripetalist majoritarianism, which bears greater risk of violent relapse. Then again, sticky consociational institutions accommodate societal conflict rather than solving it.

C. STV and SMP: Northern Ireland’s contrasting electoral regimes

Due to its combination of proportionality and preferential voting, STV has been described as “the best of both worlds” in the Northern Irish context (Mitchell, 2014, p. 247). There, local NIA elections and EP elections are conducted under STV. On the ballot (see figure 1) voters are asked to assign numbers to the candidates available, according to preference. The crucial difference between AV and STV, then, is that the latter uses a simple droop quota to translate vote shares into a distribution of multiple seats per constituency. This gives STV its proportionality. First preference votes are counted in randomised order until one candidate reaches the electoral threshold defined by the droop-quota. Once the quota is reached, the candidate is deemed elected. All the candidate’s first-preference votes that exceed the quota are disposed and the second preferences on these ballots are assigned to the remaining candidates. Once first and second preferences amount to the electoral threshold for another candidate, she is deemed elected and the exceeding votes are, again, allocated to the remaining candidates according to lower-tier preferences. This process reiterates until all seats in the constituency are filled (see Gallagher et al., 2011; Sinnot, 2010; van der Eijk & Marsh, 2007, p. 7-9; Cave, 2013).

\[ \frac{v}{s+1} + 1; v \text{ valid votes casted, divided by the sum } s \text{ of seats to be filled and one, plus one.} \]
Under STV, voters do not have to fear that their vote is wasted if they vote for an unpopular party or candidate, nor are they otherwise incentivised to deviate from their sincere preference. A voter’s dominant strategy under STV is always to vote truthfully (van der Eijk & Marsh, 2007, p.8; Sinnott, 2010). The persistence of segmental politics in Northern Ireland is, thus, a hurtful reminder of sustained strife. In absence of formal party-compulsion, “ethno-national blocs could disappear if voters decided to put their support behind parties who advanced non-ethnic issues” (Nagle & Clancy, 2012, p.83).

STV is unique in that it is the only PR system in use in the UK (for a comparison with list-PR and AV, see Coakley, 2009, p.263). In Northern Ireland this prevents that any one minority dominates over the rest. STV does so without relying on the same heavy institutional checks and minority securities typical of other PR systems. Assemblies elected by STV can be expected to be somewhat heterogeneous but, in absence of party-compulsion, they are more capable of accommodating cross-community interests than, say, list-PR (Horowitz, 2002).

Some say, STV weakens party-cohesion (e.g., Lijphart, 1991, p. 99). The validity of this claim can be questioned on two grounds. Firstly, empirical studies have repeatedly failed to evidence party demise in STV countries. Party-political and candidate-specific considerations, it seems, supplement each other (Mitchell, 2014; see also Gallagher, Laver, & Mair, 2011, p. 389). Secondly, the postulation that candidate-based voting undermines party-coherence follows the overarching argument that juxtaposes dispersion of conflicting interests with their concentration along party lines. Such concentration can occur under STV, although only by the voter’s concrete wish (Nagle & Clancy, 2012, p. 83). Voters may for example choose to vote for candidates of the same party only, a practice known as ‘straight ticket’ (see Marsh, 2007).

Lastly, the contention that STV is too complicated (Lijphart, 1991, p. 99) is outdated. Differentiating who bears its complexity, no issue arises for the voters who only assign numbered preferences to the candidates (Sinnott, 2010, p. 117). Such preference-orderings are familiar from many situations. The decision whether to have Italian, Japanese, or fast food for dinner involves ordering the alternatives in a similar way. Presumably, rational actors would choose the alternative they enjoy most, would deviate to their second preference if the first became unavailable, and so forth. STV’s complexity falls to the experts whose job it is to process the votes (Mitchell, 2014). STV is no more mysterious than the formulae underlying other systems. “Try discussing d’Hondt, Hare and Sainte-Lague in public bars!” (O’Leary, 2001, p. 71).
Single Member Plurality (SMP)\(^4\), on the other hand, is used throughout the UK in elections to the Westminster parliament. In contrast to STV, it is infamous for disproportional outcomes. Interested readers are referred to Gallagher et al. (2011, p.372) for a thorough introduction. Of importance to the remainder of this study is that, different to STV, SMP voting is conditional rather than preferential. The voter has to take a discrete choice; voting for one party means voting against all of its contenders.

**III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

It follows that STV’s and SMP’s merits should be measured against their performance. Conflict mitigation can be operationalised as the extent of integration between the social segments expressed in their likelihood to vote for parties from the opposed side or non-sectarian parties, as well as readiness to reward moderation in one’s own group. Overall, one would expect voting-transfers from more radical to more moderate parties and moderation efforts of radical parties in response to voters’ altered preferences.

#### A. Prior evaluation and tentative hypotheses

Studying Northern Irish regional elections over time, Mitchell (2014) finds that prior to 1998, “inter-ethnic vote-pooling in Northern Ireland was very close to zero. Afterwards transfers from the moderate unionist UUP to the moderate nationalist SDLP averaged 32 per cent (and 13 per cent in the opposite direction) in the period 1998–2007” (p.1). A look at the 2017 NIA election data (EONI, 2017) accords with these findings. Although net-transfers benefited moderate parties as projected, the two radical parties still hold most seats in the NIA, with the DUP accounting for 28 and Sinn Fein for 27 out of 90. Hitherto, moderates do not outweigh the radical wings on either side of the cleavage.\(^5\)

The second type of moderation, radical parties following the new electoral preferences of their voters towards the centre, is apparent: Sinn Fein and DUP, who both refused to engage in power-sharing immediately after the Belfast Agreement, are today the main actors in the very institutions they once despised. This more conciliatory course has enabled them to reap votes from their moderate intra-ethnic contenders (Wilford, 2010, pp. 135-13, see also Gordon, 2008; Nagle & Clancy, 2012). The few remaining ‘abstentionist’ parties fell in disfavour. As of 2018, the only such party in the NIA (the TUV), holds a single seat. Thus, the more voters prefer moderation the more parties are willing to moderate. If parties fail to moderate they risk to incur

\(^4\) Otherwise known as First Pass the Post (FPTP) or simple plurality voting.

\(^5\) An analysis of the lower-tier vote-transfers during the 2017 NIA election is available in XLS at www.nielectionresearch.weebly.com.
vote loss within and, sometimes, between the two ethno-national blocs. The following segment introduces single-peakedness in the context of Social Choice Theory (SCT) and its meaning for predicting voting behaviour in divided societies.

**B. Social Choice Theory**

SCT deals with “the aggregation of individual interests, or judgements, or well-beings, into some aggregate notion of social welfare, social judgement or social choice” (Sen, 2017a). The quest for fundamental conditions under which to aggregate individual preference orderings meaningfully at societal level go back to Marquis de Condorcet (1785). Arrow (1963; see also Sen, 2017b) identifies four ‘natural conditions’ for societal decision-making in a democratic way. They are ‘unrestricted domain’, ‘unanimity’, ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA), and ‘non-dictatorship’. Put simply\(^6\), it is demanded that an aggregation of individual preferences should be able to return any logically possible alternative, should consider everybody’s preferences, should not consider irrelevant alternatives, and should not fall under the sole control of one individual. These are held to be the very conditions for meaningful democracy.

Arrow (1963) subsequently proved that there is no possible system that complies to all his criteria (i.e., Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’). A dictatorship always exhibits unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, whereas any non-dictatorial system fails to provide them simultaneously unless the decision-domain is restricted (p. 59). SCT is of interest to this study because the ranked voting analysed by Arrow closely resembles STV.

The general reasoning of preference ordering also precedes the discrete voting decision, as exemplified by SMP. Different to SMP, where that ranking must be translated into a discrete decision for one and against all other parties (Dahlberg, 2013; van der Eijk, van der Brug, Kroh, & Franklin, 2006), STV effectuates all relevant tiers of a voter’s preference ordering. Like Coakely and Fraenkel (2010), this paper considers voting outcomes in Northern Ireland as close to complete group rankings *sensu* Arrow. Applying SCT constitutes a certain heuristic limitation, as it knowingly disregards the possibility of strategic voting. In the case of Northern Ireland, however, the risk of voters’ tactical deviation is rather low to begin with, as will be outlined below.

\(^6\) For the formal theorems expressed in axiomatic terms see e.g., Gaertner (2010) and Sen (2017b).
C. Domain condition by single-peakedness

To overcome Arrow’s theorem means to proof that an election process is bound to lead to a meaningful outcome: A candidate who would win a pairwise contest against any of her contenders individually must be the eventual winner. That candidate is called a ‘Condorcet Winner’. To facilitate, one may condition the unrestricted domain set out by Arrow to resemble more closely the situation one wishes to analyse (Gaertner, 2001). Northern Ireland’s society is thoroughly divided by a segmental cleavage which conditions the interests of people. This, in turn, can be expected to affect their preconceived electoral preferences. We may, therefore, assume that the domain can be limited to those behavioural patterns we expect to see. The condition for preferences to be ‘single-peaked’ very well materialises in a divided society. A single-peaked curve is “one which changes its direction at most once, from up to down” (Black, 1958, p.7). Figure 1 shows three single-peaked preference orderings over five alternatives.

![Figure 1: Three single-peaked preference curves over five alternatives. (Source: Black, 1948, p. 31)](source)

Such a “geometric ordering…may represent an ordering of the alternatives on some semantic issue dimension”, where, for example, left means most Nationalist and right means most Unionist (List, Luskin, Fishkin, & McLean, 2013, p. 82). Any voter’s party-preferences are defined by the voter’s position on the ethno-national issue dimension and the different parties’ various ideological distances to the voters on the same dimension (Downs, 1957, p. 47). Rational voters will, assuming their sincerity, order the parties from closest to farthest.

A societal profile of preference orderings is single-peaked only “if every individual’s preference ordering is single peaked with respect to the same geometric ordering” (Downs, 1957, p. 47). A less demanding condition than that is a society’s high ‘proximity to single-peakedness’. That means that “the existence of a large enough subset $M$ of individuals in $N$ with single-peaked preferences may also be sufficient” to justify the expectation that the characteristics of single-
peakedness are highly likely to occur at societal level (for an axiomatic definition and proof, see List et al., 2013, p.83; cf. Bossert & Peters, 2009).

While it may be unrealistic to expect absolute single-peakedness at societal level, high proximity to single-peakedness denotes a general sense of certainty (Lackner & Lackner, 2017). In a society that is characterised and deeply marked by the very same divisions which define party politics, it is reasonable to expect that people agree to a greater extent, which parties represent their own and their opponents’ group respectively, which parties are in between, and which ideological distances separate them from each other. List et al. (2013) refer to this as “meta-agreement”, Dahlberg (2013) as “perceptual agreement”. Such agreement “on a common semantic issue dimension in terms of which to conceptualise the choice at hand” involves a three-step process: (1) the focus on a common semantic issue dimension, (2) the placement of alternatives in the same left-right order on it, and (3) everybody’s identification of a personally most preferred alternative (List et al., 2013, p.84; see also Dahlberg, 2013, p. 672).

In Northern Ireland, the first step involved the emergence of conflict between Nationalist and Unionist positions. Secondly, the electorate grasps where the parties available are positioned on the continuum between extreme Unionism and Nationalism. Thirdly, voters find their own position on the divide and choose as their most preferred option the party closest to them.

STV, furthermore, involves reporting lower preference tiers. “The resulting approach to single-peakedness...can be expected to be more pronounced to the extent that there is a natural issue dimension” because the more those deliberating come to disagree, the more they come to agree about what they are disagreeing about (List et al, 2013, p.84). Empirical testing\(^7\) indicates that “for highly salient issues, which have usually received a good deal of casual deliberation in the participants’ environments, preference profiles are close to single-peaked”. The protracted Anglo-Irish rivalry certainly qualifies. Single-peakedness even holds for less issue-ridden societies like the whole UK (Fieldhouse et al., 2006). Northern Ireland most likely has proximity to single-peakedness.

Black’s theorem postulates that, if society displays (close to) single-peaked preferences, then a Condorcet winner exists (Black, 1958). Because the existence of a Condorcet winner equally fulfils the second and third of Arrow’s conditions without necessitating a dictatorship, the assumption of single-peakedness avoids impossibility by limiting Arrow’s first condition (viz.,

\(^7\) See the online appendix to List et al. (2013), accessible at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381612000886?seq=1#supplements_tab_contents.
Let’s illustrate this theoretical discussion on the example of Northern Ireland.

D. Application

Limiting the analysis to five parties, there are $5! = 120$ possible permutations to form preference orderings over these parties.\(^8\) It has been shown that for $n$ possible alternatives, $2^{n-1}$ of all possible orderings are single-peaked. For the five parties under consideration, $2^{5-1} = 16$ of the 120 possible orderings are single-peaked (see Escoffier, Lang, & Öztürk, 2008, lemma 2). Table 1 shows these 16 permutations for parties $a$, $b$, $c$, $d$, and $e$, which lie on some semantic dimension which ranges, alphabetically, from $a$ to $e$.

| $(a, b, c, d, e)$ | $(c, b, d, a, e)$ | $(d, c, e, b, a)$ | $(c, b, a, d, e)$ |
| $(b, a, c, d, e)$ | $(c, b, d, e, a)$ | $(d, e, c, b, a)$ | $(c, d, b, a, e)$ |
| $(b, c, a, d, e)$ | $(c, d, b, e, a)$ | $(e, d, c, b, a)$ | $(d, c, b, a, e)$ |
| $(b, c, d, a, e)$ | $(c, d, e, b, a)$ | $(b, c, d, e, a)$ | $(d, c, b, e, a)$ |

Table 1: All possible single-peaked orderings of five parties $a$-$e$

Replacing letters $a$ through $e$ with the five major Northern Irish parties (from Unionist to Nationalist), it becomes evident that half of the single-peaked preference orderings violate strictly ethnical voting, ranking parties from both ethno-national groups alternatingly (cf. Fraenkel & Grofman, 2004). In tables 1 and 2, the boxes containing these excludable options are coloured grey, whereas the valid eight possibilities are white.

\(^8\) $5! = 5 \times 4 \times 3 \times 2 \times 1 = 120.$
Table 2: Single-peaked party-preference orderings for Northern Ireland, strictly ethnic voting behaviour in white cells.
(source: own compilation)

Table 3 shows five societal sub-groups’ expected preference orderings of the five main parties in NI, based solely on voters’ ethno-national affiliation and the parties’ positioning on the ideological dimension given the rankings above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalist</th>
<th>Non-sectarian</th>
<th>Unionist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DUP</strong></td>
<td>resolute RN</td>
<td>moderate MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; or 5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UUP</strong></td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>APNI</strong></td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SDLP</strong></td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SF</strong></td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</table>

Table 3: Purely ethnic preference orderings for five societal sub-groups in Northern Ireland.
(source: own compilation)

Graphing these ratings, figure 3 visualises their single-peakedness. The lines connecting the dots only serve illustrative purpose due to the preference orderings being ordinal, not continuous. Visually, the preference tiers ought to be understood as running from the top to the bottom (e.g., following the dark green line the first preference for RN is SF, followed by SDLP, APNI, UUP and, lastly, DUP).
Given that voters’ preferences are fixed in the short run, parties are immediately more likely to adapt to voters’ ideological positions than the opposite (Downs, 1957). Following this reasoning, one arrives at Down’s median voter theorem which states that parties’ policy preferences tend to converge towards the one voter’s preference, who has one half of the electorate on his ideological right and the other one on his left (i.e., the median voter). That the median voter need not be at the centre of the ideological spectrum is apparent in Down’s treatise on strategic voting (p. 49). It is impossible for the median voter to be the most Unionist or Nationalist for any odd-numbered electorate in Northern Ireland. Thus, the probability to encounter the median position must approach zero towards the extremes, but the shape of the distribution curve need not necessarily resemble any symmetry.

As was indicated earlier, people in divided societies are deterred from misrepresenting their single-peaked preferences (Moulin, 1980). Because the Condorcet winner is always determined by the median-peak, a viable way to alter the outcome to one’s benefit would be to change the median peak. One would must flip to the other side of the ideological spectrum to do so. That is contrary to any voter’s interest. This insight explains preference-voting’s often-cited insusceptibility to strategic voting (see Gallagher et al., 2011; Sinnott, 2010; Mitchell, 2014). Single-peakedness, thus, avoids impossibility and allows for an aggregation of preferences in ways that are efficient and strategy-proof.

Based on the theoretical framework, the following hypotheses guide the analysis:
**H₁:** Likelihoods, by ethno-nationality, to vote for DUP, UUP, APNI, SDLP, SF and others respectively are asymmetrically distributed along the ideological issue dimension.

**H₂:** The likelihoods, by ethno-nationality, to vote for DUP, UUP, APNI, SDLP, SF and others respectively differ considerably between local (NIA) and National (UK) elections.

### IV. DATA AND METHODS

To translate the directional assumptions described above into quantitative predictions of voting behaviour and to specify the position of parties on the ideological issue dimension, I proceed to analyse survey data from a relatively recent series of surveys in Northern Ireland. The analysis is performed in SPSS.

The Northern Ireland General Election Attitudes Survey (Tonge, 2010, 2015, 2017) is a validated dataset (n=3959), from which one can trace closely the relation between ethno-national identity and concrete electoral choice. The data-set includes stated voting decisions for both UK elections (SMP) and first-preference votes in NIA elections (STV). It was compiled using computer assisted personal interviews (CAPI) with randomly selected adults aged 18 or more, sampled representatively from all over Northern Ireland. Moreover, the respondents were asked to self-complete a questionnaire thereinafter. The surveys are certified by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK).

The three individual sets for three different years were pooled into one dataset, including only the variables relevant to this study. This involved reversely recoding some of the values to ensure consistency in the variable outcomes over time and among the formerly separate sets. A cohort variable, denominating the year of the cases, was also included to ensure traceability of the cases to the original data set. Table 4 shows the frequencies regarding the independent variable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>valid %</th>
<th>Cumulative %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid Unionist</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>1358</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3739</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Refused</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3959</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Frequencies of ethno-national affiliation in Tonge (2010-2017). (source: own compilation)
A. Variables

The dependent variable is the discrete choice to vote for one of the parties available either conditionally (SMP) or as first preference (STV). While it would be insightful to study lower preference tiers too, this step further exceeds the scope of my BA Thesis. This approach seems legitimate as only about 5% of seats on average transfer between parties at lower tiers, mostly intra-ethnically. To overcome the complication of party variation over time – some parties demise, others form – the analysis limits itself to the five parties, which have continuously been present throughout the period of analysis: DUP, UUP, APNI, SDLP, and SF. Any other party-votes are included in the category ‘others’. Thus, the dependent variable consists of six nominal party alternatives. Merging all ‘others’ into one outcome alternative appears appropriate a tool of facilitation because their vote share does usually not exceed one NIA-seat (1.12…%) and, overall, the nationalist and unionist tendencies within this artificial category cancel out rather nicely.

The independent variable is the respondents’ stated ethno-national identity, (i.e., Nationalist, Unionist, or Neither). Some political and socio-demographic indicators other than ethno-nationality are devised as control variables. These include political self-positioning on left to right (0-10) scale, gender (dummy), age (18-25; 26-35; 36-45; 46-54; 55-65; and 65+), and level of education (none, primary, secondary, tertiary, or other). Unfortunately, data for household income, another frequently found control variable, was unreliable. Too many participants refused to answer this sensitive question.

B. Analysis

To test for the existence and strength of influence of ethno-national affiliation on party choice, standard multinomial logistic regression is used (see e.g., Cramer, 2003, pp. 104-125). Two separate regressions are performed over the same data-set. The first tests for voting choice in the UK elections of 2010, 2015, and 2017, conducted under SMP. The second analyses ethno-national affiliation’s effect on first preference choice during the NIA election of 2017, conducted under STV. Multinomial logistic regression is a multi-equation model that estimates Y-1 logit equations and assumes logarithmic distribution, as opposed to normal distribution, of the probability of the event. With regards to the Y=6 parties dependent variable, the regression estimates 5 logit equations and maintains the sixth category as reference.9 Here, the artificial

9 for DUP: \( \log(y = 1) = \log \left( \frac{p(y = 1)}{1 - (p = 1)} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 p_{i2} + \ldots + \beta_p x_{i1} \) for \( i = 1 \ldots n \),

for UUP: \( \log(y = 2) = \log \left( \frac{p(y = 2)}{1 - (p = 2)} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 p_{i2} + \ldots + \beta_p x_{i2} \) for \( i = 1 \ldots n \),

for APNI: \( \log(y = 3) = \log \left( \frac{p(y = 3)}{1 - (p = 3)} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 p_{i2} + \ldots + \beta_p x_{i3} \) for \( i = 1 \ldots n \),
party sub-type ‘others’ serves as reference category. The model thus calculates the logits for the five major parties, DUP, UUP, APNI, SDLP, and SF, with respect to ‘others’. That is a conceptually sound comparison because, on average, ‘others’ evinces a non-sectarian position.

Regressing the observed party choice on ethno-nationality as well as the control variables yields statistical indicators, two of which will be discussed. The $\beta$ coefficient shows the marginal rate of change (i.e., the change in predicted log likelihood to choose a certain party per one unit change in the explanatory variable). The odds ratio (OR), which is the exponentiation of the $\beta$ coefficient\textsuperscript{10}, provides the relative likelihoods that people with a certain characteristic (i.e., the independent variable) will vote for the party, compared to voting for ‘others’. The OR of the reference category is by default OR=1. Thus, an OR greater than 1 indicates that an individual will more likely vote for a certain party than for the reference category. Conversely, an OR smaller than 1 indicates that an individual’s likelihood to vote for that party is smaller than to vote for ‘other’. The OR’s magnitude indicates the exact probabilistic difference. An OR of 1.2, for instance, means that the voter is twenty percent more likely to vote for the party concerned than to vote for ‘other’, while an OR of 0.2 (one fifth) suggests that the voter is five times less likely to vote for the party at hand.\textsuperscript{11}

V. RESULTS

Let us see how the differences in OR yield an empirically informed spatial impression of ethno-nationally conditioned voting in Northern Ireland.

A. Model fit\textsuperscript{12}

Ideally the sample would include observations for all possible combinations of the dependent variables’ values. By including five independent variables, the number of combinations of their values has skyrocketed. There are some combinations of these variables for which there are no observations. With a small sample size (N=3959), empty cells are almost inevitable. Cases of Nationalists voting for UUP were particularly scarce and results for this combination are meaningless in both models. Given that the standard-errors are reasonable for all other outcome-categories, all other findings are valid (Field, 2009, p.307).

\textsuperscript{10} OR = e^\beta.

\textsuperscript{11} 1 * 120% = 1.2 and 1 / 0.2 = 5.

\textsuperscript{12} the model outputs in .spv format are available at www.nielectionresearch.weebly.com.
The chi-square ($\chi^2$) test measures the decrease in unexplained variance between the baseline model and the final model. In both cases, this change is large and highly significant ($p<0.001$), which means that both models explain a significant amount of the original variance. The pearson deviance dispersion parameters are close to 1 for both models, which does not indicate overdispersion. Moreover, the Pseudo R-squares (Cox & Snell, Nagelkerke) are very similar and reasonably large in both models. That indicates overall good model fit. In the following, statistical significance is marked by an asterisk.

B. Northern Ireland Assembly Election

Table 5: Results of the Multinomial Logistic Regression in the Final Model Showing Effects on voting behaviour in NIA elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First preference (NIA)?</th>
<th>$\beta$ (SE)</th>
<th>lower</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DUP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>3.87 (0.51)*</td>
<td>17.83</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>129.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>0.00 (1.00)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>0.64 (0.41)</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UUP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>2.51 (0.52)*</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>33.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>-19.37 (0)</td>
<td>3.854E-9</td>
<td>3.854E-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>-0.59 (0.56)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APNI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>0.22 (0.67)</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>1.39 (0.79)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>18.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>0.85 (0.40)*</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SDLP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>-0.69 (0.87)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>3.11 (0.72)*</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>22.50</td>
<td>92.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>1.67 (0.36)*</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>10.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>-1.38 (1.12)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>4.14 (0.71)*</td>
<td>15.46</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>252.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>0.11 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reference category is: others. $R^2 = 0.822$ (Cox & Snell), 0.846 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (15) = 941.059*$, $p < 0.05$.

Table 5 shows the model output for the 2017 NIA election with regards to first preference votes given. The coefficients for political self-assessment, gender, age, and education attainment are suppressed as none of the control variables rendered significant results. Unionists are not significantly more or less likely to vote for APNI, SDLP, or Sinn Fein. They are, however, more than twelve times more likely to vote for UUP and more than forty times more likely to vote for DUP than they are to vote for ‘others’.

$$\phi_{\text{Pearson (NIA)}} = \frac{\chi^2}{df} = \frac{1889.752}{1815} = 1.04$$

$$\phi_{\text{Pearson (UK)}} = \frac{\chi^2}{df} = \frac{3935.258}{3455} = 1.13$$
Nationalists, on the other hand, are not significantly more or less likely to vote for DUP, UUP, or APNI than for ‘others’. They are, however, more than twenty times more likely to vote for SDLP (OR=22.5) and even sixty times more likely to vote for Sinn Fein (OR=62.5) than for ‘others’. Self-declared non-sectarians are significantly more likely to vote for either SDLP (OR=5.33) or APNI (OR=2.33) than they are to vote for ‘others’. Interestingly, their likelihood to vote for SDLP is greater than for APNI.

C. UK Parliamentary Elections

Table 6: Results of the Multinomial Logistic Regression in the Final Model Showing Effects on voting behaviour in UK elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party voted for?</th>
<th>$\beta$ (SE)</th>
<th>lower</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DUP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>0.07 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>2.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>-3.90 (0.67)*</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>-1.86 (0.35)*</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right (0-10 scale)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.04)*</td>
<td>1.100</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UUP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>-0.34 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>-23.75 (0.00)</td>
<td>4.845 E-11</td>
<td>4.845 E-11</td>
<td>4.845 E-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>-1.86 (0.39)*</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right (0-10 scale)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.05)*</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APNI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>-0.85 (0.55)</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>-0.38 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>0.26 (0.42)</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>2.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right (0-10 scale)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.06)*</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SDLP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>-1.03 (0.53)*</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>2.39 (0.34)*</td>
<td>5.602</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>21.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>1.45 (0.32)*</td>
<td>2.275</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>8.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right (0-10 scale)</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.05)*</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>-2.26 (1.06)*</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>3.91 (0.34)*</td>
<td>25.553</td>
<td>49.83</td>
<td>97.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>1.44 (0.33)*</td>
<td>2.213</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>8.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right (0-10 scale)</td>
<td>-0.32 (0.05)*</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reference category is: others. $R^2 = 0.731$ (Cox & Snell), 0.753 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2 (20) = 2232.806^*$, *p < 0.05.

Table 6 shows the model output for the UK elections of 2010, 2015, and 2017 regarding ethno-nationality’s effects on party choice. The coefficients for gender, age, and education attainment are suppressed as none of them yielded significant results. The respondents’ political self-assessment did add explanatory value to the model. Its coefficients were statistically significant for all three categories of ethno-national affiliation.
Unionists are hesitant to vote for either SDLP (OR=0.36) or Sinn Fein (OR=0.1). Towards their end of the ideological spectrum, they seem to be more dispersed towards the centre and are not significantly more or less likely to vote for DUP, UUP, or APNI than for any other smaller party. Meanwhile, Nationalists OR to vote for the Democratic Unionist Party is 0.02. They are, thus, fifty times less likely to vote for DUP than to vote for ‘others’. The same people are more than ten times more likely to vote for SDLP (OR=10.93), and about fifty times more likely to vote for Sinn Fein (OR=49.83) than to elect ‘others’. They are not significantly more or less likely to vote for Ulster Unionist Party or Alliance.

Non-sectarians are about four times more likely to vote for Sinn Fein (OR=4.23) or SDLP (OR=4.29) than to vote for any smaller party, which comes as quite a surprise given these parties’ Nationalist agenda. Non-sectarians are equally hesitant to vote for DUP (OR=0.15) or UUP (OR=0.15) They are, namely, seven times less likely to vote for either of the Unionist parties than to vote for ‘others’. Unsurprisingly, they are not statistically more or less likely to vote for Alliance than for any of the other smaller (mostly cross-community) parties.

Lastly, the odds ratios for DUP (OR=1.2) and UUP (OR=1.14) indicate that they are favoured by voters on the right, while APNI (OR=0.88) leans slightly to the left. SDLP (OR=0.81) and Sinn Fein (OR=0.73) can be found further left. The β coefficients for left-right indicate that with each one step to the right on the ten-point scale, a voter’s statistical likelihood to vote DUP increases by 18%, for UUP by 13%, while it decreases 13% for APNI, 20% for SDLP, and 32% for SF.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Figure 4 plots how the three different ethno-national categories of voters behave in local NIA elections and national UK elections. Ordered along the issue dimension (viz., Unionist, Neither, Nationalist), the spatial differences in voting behaviour become apparent.

In NIA elections, the concentration towards the wings is very pronounced. Both Nationalists and Unionists are much more likely to vote for the more radical party within their respective ethno-national group than to vote for the moderate intra-ethnic alternative. Here, the likelihoods to vote for the moderate ethno-national parties (UUP and SDLP) amounts to little more than a third of the likelihood to elect radical contenders (DUP and SF). The ethnic determinism among Unionists and Nationalists seems strong enough to disassociate them almost entirely from each other. It is eye-opening that neither of the two ethno-nationalities seem to consider cross-community parties such as APNI an alternative.
SDLP seems to even attract voters who do not openly sympathise with Irish Nationalism. Non-sectarians are, indeed, slightly more likely to vote for SDLP than to vote for their most representative group option, Alliance. Given the fact that Nationalists are the smallest societal cluster, and that Unionists and non-sectarians are almost equal in group size, it is a quite rational option for non-sectarians to vote for a (moderate) Nationalist’s position to even out Unionists’ initial advantage. Under the constitutional obligation of ethno-national co-government, it is in their best interest that the power-ratio between the opposing groups be as balanced as possible.

It is conclusive that the Nationalists, who are outnumbered by their opponents, rely more extensively on their ethno-nationality when making voting decisions and resort to more radical options more likely than their Unionist counterparts. They appear defensive in the face of an overpowering threat. This behaviour is more pronounced in UK elections. While the ethno-national rivalry on Unionists’ side is reduced to a mere dislike towards Nationalist parties, Nationalists maintain their strict predisposition to vote for ‘their’ parties and are still about four times more likely to choose radical Sinn Fein over moderate SDLP - that is a greater difference than in NIA elections. Their indifference between non-sectarian and Unionist parties shifts to clearly disfavour DUP. The difference decrease in likelihoods between their own parties and non-sectarian contenders indicates that, at more distant national level of governance, Nationalists are less suspicious of cross-community parties.
Does that mean that the conflict between Nationalists and Unionists itself is more distant than at local level? Unionists’ voting behaviour certainly does not contradict this surmise. Their concentration on ethno-nationality has totally vanished. They are as likely to vote for APNI or ‘others’ in national elections. This gives a valuable insight into Unionists’ self-understanding as truly British. They, perhaps, feel much closer to British politics and feel stronger about the issues that appear on the national agenda than the Nationalist population, which relates to the Irish Republic rather than Westminster. The availability of the major British leftist party, Labour, in these elections offers an interesting alternative for left-oriented Unionists to break with their ethno-national predetermination to vote for right-wing parties. Such behaviour would explain voters massive decrease in likelihood to vote DUP and UUP compared to non-sectarian alternatives. This finding contradicts claims that the “ethnic divide in Northern Ireland leaves little space for people to focus on politics of Left and Right” (Edwards & Parr, 2016). To the contrary, Unionists seem to consider UK elections as contests in their own right, rather than second-order regional elections. They do not project the local conflict to the national sphere as strongly as Nationalists, who lack identification with that level of governance.

Non-sectarians, again, favour nationalist parties to other options and dislike Unionist parties in this context. That their disfavour for DUP and UUP is greater than their favour for SDLP and SF, relative to cross-community options, may indicate their intention to even the playing field of ethno-national politics to favour middle ground outcomes. Overall, however, it their preferences differ least of all societal groups between local and national elections.

Returning to the two guiding hypotheses, both are confirmed. Likelihoods to vote for parties are by no means symmetrically distributed, not in NIA elections and less so in UK elections. In the latter, Unionist preferences are many times closer to an ideological null-point than Nationalists’. Unionists seem to vote more on a political issue basis than on grounds of ethno-nationality in UK elections. At the local level both groups vote strictly ethno-nationally and prefer radicals to moderates. It is, thus, hard to foresee political moderation based on the groups’ voting behaviour.

This study has not found evidence for the alleged moderating effects of STV, as overall the NIA elections seemed to be more defined by ethno-nationality than the UK elections. If the slight moderating effect witnessed between NIA and UK elections continues to grow in magnitude as we move to an even more distant level of governance, that may hint to a moderating effect of regionalism and supranationalism on local ethnic conflict in electoral
politics. Much research, in Northern Ireland as in divided societies elsewhere is still to be conducted before findings can become operative in the moderation of social strife.

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THE REFUGEE CRISIS

https://postgraduate.ias.unu.edu/upp/

TRACK TWO: COMMENTARY

*Cluster 4: Demographics and Migration*

**The Refugee Crisis: A Challenge for the Sovereign Power through the Lens of the Homo Sacer Concept**

POZZATO, Dorothea¹

**ABSTRACT**

This article reviews the main concepts and theories developed by the philosopher Giorgio Agamben on the ontology of power and its connection with human existence. A reflection on the role of the refugee within modern nation-states is drawn from his theories of biopolitics and Homo Sacer. Within this framework, the limits and fragilities of sovereign nation-states in governing human existence within national borders are pointed out, and parallelisms are drawn between the figure of the Homo Sacer and the refugee’s condition. The fact that the refugee—outstripped of their citizenship rights and the bearer of mere existence—is de facto excluded from the political community, renders him outside the protection and norms granted to citizens by the nation State. In line with Agamben’s conclusion, the article suggests that a new legal rights system revolving around human existence should replace the current nation/state/territory model of governance.

KEYWORDS: biopolitics, nation-states, homo sacer, refugees, citizenship, human rights

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Cara Mineo—also known as “village of the oranges”—used to be a military domain of the American troops stationed in a United States military base 50 kilometers away from Catania, Sicily. After the American troops left in 2010, it remained abandoned. However, its situation changed one year later, when the Italian government decided to use this infrastructure to receive asylum-seekers. With around 4000 inhabitants, the Cara (Reception Center for asylum-seekers) of Mineo is now the biggest reception center in Europe (Liberti, 2014). Although detention in this type of center should be limited to a maximum of 180 days—as of 2018—for identification and application processing (Lgs. Decree no 113/2018), many migrants stay in the center for over a year, waiting for a decision over their next steps. They spend their days in the “village” which is badly connected and too far to easily reach the closest urban areas. Hence, the only contact with the host country is represented by the workers and the soldiers employed in the camp.

Mineo is not an isolated case in Italy, but it recalls similar structures and conditions across various countries where irregular migrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees are detained in isolation for an undetermined time and without clear information on their integration process. The case of Australia preventing “boat people” from arriving to its borders by locating them in remote islands is well known, but other countries such as Norway have similar policies, while Denmark is currently discussing a costly plan to move its unwanted immigrants to a remote island: “a tiny, hard-to-reach island that now holds the laboratories, stables and crematory of a center for researching contagious animal diseases. As if to make the message clearer, one of the two ferries that serve the island is called the Virus” (Selsoe Sorensen, 2018).

What is the connection between nation-states and the settling of these zones of exclusion for undocumented migrants? This article reflects upon this question by looking at Agamben’s theories on biopolitics and Homo Sacer.

Agamben is a philosopher writing in the Foucauldian tradition and, in his works, seeks to explain the ontology of power and its relation with life. He further develops the concept of biopolitics introduced by Foucault in his later works. The term biopolitics refers to the connection between life and politics, where the human body and life processes are conceived as an object to be taken care of and managed by the nation-state (Dean, 2013). Within this framework, political control revolves around the administration and management of life of a population.

Agamben wrote Homo Sacer when the intellectual community debated on the meaning of Nazi detention camps. In the book, he suggests that what happened is not to be considered an
Occasional event in history, rather, it is a part of the mechanism of power. According to Agamben, states’ attempts to regulate the biological life of its citizens—or biopower—represent the intrinsic connotation of all forms of power. Reference to the two Greek words used to indicate life—zoe and bios—provides a more detailed understanding of the biopower concept. Although modern languages lost the distinction between the two, zoe can be translated and understood as natural life, and in ancient Greek it was used to indicate the mere existence shared by all animals (Agamben, 1998). Bios was used for humans in social spaces, therefore indicating the lived life as part of the polis. In other words, zoe indicated the condition of being alive, while bios referred to the organized life in a community.

Agamben argues that the politicization of the natural life has been a phenomenon common to all the epochs in Western history. What is peculiar of modern societies is the increasingly central role that biopolitical policies have: states increasingly extend their regulatory power to the private sphere of citizens’ lives, for instance through health campaigns (against smoking, for vaccinations etc.) or birth rate regularization. Modern democracies attempt to eliminate the line between biological and political life as a way to control bare life. However, this creates “zones of indistinction”, where human life is decoupled from its political part (Agamben, 1998).

Precisely at this point, the figure of the Homo Sacer comes into play. The word Sacer originated from the Indo-European language, where it meant divided, set apart. The Homo Sacer is the figure that embodies zoe, separated from bios. Because of this condition, in Roman law, the Homo Sacer was the man, who may be killed without punishments, and yet could not be sacrificed to the Gods: he had no religious value in his being banned by the social organized life (Agamben, 1998). Hence, the Homo Sacer indicated the outlawed person, that was banned from life of the community—deprived of his bios—and that could be killed without punishment as he did not have any legal protection. At the same time, because of the condition of exclusion from bios, his life was not considered expendable to the Gods.

The Homo Sacer represents then the mere bearer of zoe, naked life. This figure bears the dual condition of being outlawed—the exception to the law—but still included as it is subject to the penalty of being killed (Ibid). By becoming the exception, the Homo Sacer “blurs the lines between outlaw and citizen” (Downey, 2009: 111). The bare life/political existence binomial is a central point in the practice of biopolitical power; it is precisely at the borderline created between zoe and bios that the Homo Sacer is found.

The refugee, the stateless, and/or the irregular migrant embody the figure of the Homo Sacer in that they are excluded from the nation-state, in a situation that transcends the territoriality of
national laws and citizenship rights. The refugees, excluded from the rights and governance of the nation-state, are outstripped of their *bios*, living in a condition of bare existence (Agamben, 1995). The nation/state/territory trinity delimits laws and rights to its borders, to cover its citizens. By setting a border, it also defines the citizen/bare existence dualism. The bare existence of the modern Homo Sacer is not a marginal phenomenon to modern states, but it constitutes its most emblematic subject; according to Agamben: “If the refugee presents such a disquieting element in the order of the nation-state this is primarily because, by breaking up the identity between the human and the citizen and between nativity and nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to a crisis” (Agamben, 2000: 21).

Moreover, the condition of exclusion from citizenship rights of refugees, which should have embodied their claim on human rights, shows instead the paradox: “The conception of human rights based on the supposed existence of a human being as such, Arendt affirms, proves to be untenable as soon as those who profess it find themselves confronted for the first time with people who have really lost every quality and every specific relation except for the pure fact of being human. In the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable human rights are revealed to be without any protection precisely when it is no longer possible to conceive of them as rights of the citizens of a State” (Agamben, 2000: 188-189).

In 1943, while Europe was witnessing the last years of the Second World War and the number of displaced, stateless and refugees was continuing to increase, philosopher Hanna Arendt published an essay entitled “We Refugees”. The author saw in the figure of the refugee the “avant-garde of their people” (Agamben, 1995:114) who first experienced the limits and obsolescence of the understanding of political subjects as linked to nation-states.

Fifty years later, Agamben takes up the arguments of Arendt, suggesting that within a system of governance of nation-states, the protection of human existence comes into crisis when divided from citizenship (Ibid). In other words, the displaced, stateless, and refugees—although de jure holding human rights and basic protections enshrined in national constitutions—are de facto without legal protection as long as the nation-state lacks will or capacity to enforce them.

Agamben argues that the model of modern nation-states is challenged by an increasing “permanently resident mass of noncitizens” (Agamben, 1995: 117) neither naturalized nor repatriated, hence transcending the order of territoriality—inherent to the concept of sovereignty. Here is where zones of indistinction between inside and outside, exception and norm are created (Downey, 2009). A refugee camp is the spatial embodiment of a state’s attempt to localize the exception, to exercise its power over the bare life outstripped from its
political existence. It is visible in state’s attempts to marginalize irregular migrants, either by relegating powerless humans in isolated camps, or by militarizing borders and thereby de facto condemning the *hominæ sacri* to a priori exclusion from rights.

What then is the solution suggested by Agamben? According to the philosopher, reactions such as Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open Germany’ borders to welcome refugees, although significant and compassionate as they are, do not question the essence of the political system but see the problem of the refugees as a gap in the system that has to be overcome by including the excluded. This simply reproduces the current structure of nation-states, and therefore does not solve the issue of territorial sovereignty.

The works of Arendt and Agamben suggest that instead of unquestioning the model of the nation-state, we should rethink our political philosophy based on the figure of the refugee, the *Homo Sacer* par excellence. The refugee, in their a-territorial condition should become the model of a new political system, where the “guiding concept would no longer be the *ius* of the citizen, but rather the *refugium* of the individual” (Agamben, 1995:117). In other words, instead of talking about inclusion and integration, Agamben challenges us to think beyond the limits of conventional citizenship, and to move towards a reorganization of rights around the a-territoriality of human existence. Human rights should not be contingent on what nationality one happens to have.

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Conditionality in Female-Targeted CCT’s: A Gender Perspective

VAN WIJGERDEN, Jessica

ABSTRACT

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) are designed to support the most vulnerable individuals and elevate them out of poverty. Cash benefits are often given out to the female members with the expectation that women will spend the money wisely on education and health needs (Taokobong, 2016). However, the design of social protection programs such as CCT’s may be compromised due to existing gender inequalities within particular communities. These specific social protection programs that were created to empower women have not taken into consideration how certain conditions may even enhance gender stereotypes and cause regressive impacts on women’s well-being. Ultimately, such conditions within female-targeted CCT’s may hinder the effectiveness of programs with regards to women empowerment. It seems that in such situations, policy makers are forgetting that women empowerment is necessary not only for the independence and well-being of women, but also for economic and social well-being of the society in the long run (UN Women, 2018). Therefore, this commentary argues for the following thesis: Conditionality within female-targeted CCT’s can contribute to gender-inequality and compromise the overall effectiveness of the program in terms of women empowerment.

KEYWORDS: Conditional Cash Transfers, female-centered benefits, gender inequality, social protection, social justice

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I. INTRODUCING THE ARGUMENT

In an era where behavioral economics and Randomized Control Trials are trending in the developmental sector, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT’s) take center stage. CCT’s have been popularized and praised for its’ impact on poverty eradication. Even former World Bank president Jim Kim (at the 2017 World Economic Forum) regarded CCT’s as the magic formula to help any stunted country as it provides aid to those in poverty while simultaneously stimulating the economy (Cookson, 2018). A World Bank report states the amount of CCT’s in 2017 have doubled since 2008. In 2017, at least one CCT has been implemented by sixty-seven countries (World Bank, 2017; Cookson, 2018). Despite the widespread popularity of this type of Social Protection scheme, a deeper look is necessary to evaluate the impact CCT’s might have on beneficiaries who are marginalized within their communities.

In theory, CCT’s are designed to support the most vulnerable individuals and lift them out of poverty. Cash benefits are often given out to the female members with the expectation that women will spend the money wisely on education and health needs (Taukobong, 2016). Additionally, to ensure the money is ideally spent, CCT’s include conditionalities aiming to direct behavior towards certain objectives of alleviating monetary and even areas of multidimensional poverty (Martorano & Sanfilippo, 2012).

However, the design of social protection programs such as CCT’s may be compromised due to existing gender inequalities within the community. Certain conditionalities can even harm those who are marginalized due to the uneven power distribution not only within the community, but also within their household (Carrol, 2011). Such inequalities can be ingrained in several ways and are observed in either existing social norms; e.g. the role in which women are expected to play as unpaid care giver, or poor local infrastructure; e.g. the limited access females may have to health services due to unsafe or unreliable transportation within certain regions.

Social protection programs that were created to empower women are therefore not taking into the consideration how certain conditions may even enhance gender stereotypes and have a regressive impact on women’s well-being. Ultimately, such conditions within female-targeted CCT’s may hinder the effectiveness of programs with regards to women empowerment. It seems that in such situations, policymakers are forgetting that women empowerment is necessary not only for the independence and well-being of women, but also for economic and social well-being of the society in the long run (UN Women, 2018).
Therefore, this commentary argues for the following thesis: Conditionality within female-targeted CCT’s can contribute to gender-inequality and compromise the overall effectiveness of the program in terms of women empowerment.

Within the topic of targeted and conditional cash transfers there are several perspectives that can be explored. To give a wholistic approach to the discourse, this opinion piece will start off by stating the main counterarguments highlighting the reasoning behind female-targeted CCTs. Finally, arguments and evidence will be presented defending the above stated thesis and highlighting the flaws of such program.

II. COUNTERARGUMENTS

Within this section, arguments will be dissected in terms of the purpose of social protection, the reasoning behind targeting women, and the necessity of conditionality. By presenting examples of specific case studies, these arguments are adequately supported.

A. Counterargument 1: The importance of targeting women

Social protection programs such as CCT’s are essentially focused on supporting those who are vulnerable. Within this frame of mind, focusing cash benefits on women is necessary since they are impacted by poverty more than men within a household (Sholkamy, 2011). Especially in heavily patriarchal societies, women would need more attention due to this intra-household inequality within the distribution of assets, power, and independence.

According to Sholkamy (2011), targeting women can result in positive returns that may result in their increased bargaining power within the household. By having a say within the patriarchal constricted environment, these women can feel empowered. An example of this is the impact of Bolsa Família, which is the largest CCT based in Brazil, had on the women in their program. The CCT increased the bargaining power of the female beneficiaries significantly within the household, more specifically in terms of making decisions in relation to the school attendance of the children and health expenditures (De Brauw, 2014). However, these increases have been found mainly in urban regions. No significant impact was found in rural regions where infrastructure is poor and accessibility is limited.

B. Counterargument 2: Women spend their money wisely

Furthermore, there are other reasons for targeting women in CCT’s, mainly the behavioral aspects that are found as a result of giving the cash benefits to women. According to Taukobong (2016), women spend the received cash benefits in a more ‘desired’ manner than their male
counterparts. The women’s spending habits result in benefits that are extended to the whole household, as women tend to focus on health and education expenditures, rather than on their own leisure. An example of this can be found in the case of Progresa, formally known as Oportunidades, which was a CCT based in Mexico. Similar to Bolsa Familia, the results found that the female beneficiaries would spend on household necessities that would improve household well-being (Bradshaw, 2008). This partially contributed to the high success rate in terms of school enrolment and outcomes for child and maternal health.

C. Counterargument 3: Conditionalities are necessary for ensuring that the cash benefit is used effectively

The support for conditionality can be found in two lines of reasoning. First, conditionality can be used as a nudging tool for the beneficiaries to make the right decisions on how they might utilize the received benefit, therefore making sure that the desired outcomes are directed to the objectives of the CCT (Bradshaw, 2008). In the case of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program, implemented across the Philippines and the largest CCT in South-East Asia, the increased positive results in school attendance and health outcomes are linked to the conditionalities related to the program. The school and health related conditions within the CCT made sure the beneficiaries would comply with certain standards to receive the cash benefit (Montilla et al., 2015). Therefore, in an indirect manner, Pantawid Pamilyang reached its’ objectives, specifically on the returns in schooling, and was deemed successful.

Secondly, conditionality can be used as a way of building a social contract between the program and its beneficiaries. An example would be a CCT implemented in Ghana, where beneficiaries preferred conditionalities within the program rather than no conditionalities at all (Yeboah et al., 2017). More specifically, they preferred conditions that would result in an increase in human capital and require participation in community service. In this sense, they perceived the conditionalities as a means to not only feel they have earned the benefit, but also to fill in certain gaps found in their deprived communities.

III. REBUTTAL: WHY CCT’S TARGETED AT WOMEN ARE NOT EXACTLY IDEAL

Within this section, three arguments opposing the female-targeted CCT’s are presented. The flaws are explored within three arguments, which are supported by several case studies of CCT’s and other social protection programs around the world related to gender inequality.
A. Argument 1: Social protection should go beyond targeting and onto inclusion mechanisms

As stated in a prior counterargument, women are on average poorer than men (Sholkamy, 2011). However, their situation would need to be understood on another level by identifying the power dynamics within the household and within society at large. The unequal distribution of care work, which exists out of various components that vary from physical labor to providing encouragement and accompanying relatives to the doctor, is often the responsibility of the mother in a household (Razavi, 2007; Cookson, 2018). This has to be taken into consideration when targeting women, due the often unpaid or underpaid nature of care work that takes up these women’s time and energy.

In the case of Progresa in Mexico, the female-targeted conditional cash transfers did not necessarily circumvent the inequalities when it comes to the bargaining power of women within a household. Indeed, similar to Bolsa Familia, women had certain decision-making power on how to spend the money and the expenditures were mainly focused on health and education costs (Bradshaw, 2008). However, this does not imply that the power distribution between men and women within the household have changed.

According to Bradshaw (2008), qualitative research within Progresa showed that men would accept that women are bringing an extra income within the family as a rational choice, as long as the women are fulfilling their role in the household tending to (often unpaid) care labor. Therefore, targeting money to women does not necessarily benefit the women if their care work is not taken into account. Gender stereotyping and marginalization of women still prevail if money, and not power, is being transferred to the households.

However, by including men within the discussion on the importance of women empowerment, significant changes can be made in the social discourse to circumvent gender-related stereotypes and the unequal distribution of power (Pawlack, 2013). One case where this succeeded was in light of a female targeted micro-credit program in Rwanda, where a pilot project targeted at men was launched to bring awareness of the importance of women empowerment. According to Pawlack (2013), results showed a shift in the mindsets and behaviors of the men by discussing the power dynamics and gender roles that play within their household. Behavioral changes ranged from sharing responsibilities when it comes to household activities and standing up against gender-based violence. Although this example is
not attached to a CCT specifically, it is a significant portrayal of how men can be involved in women empowerment within social protection programs.

Therefore, targeting women alone is not the answer, it is also necessary to target men. The women are operating within their communities, not with an isolated bubble, through the nature of their socially constructed role within the care work. Although seemingly counter-intuitive, to truly target women, it is important to not exclude, thereby alienating, male household members within these programs. Inequality needs to be addressed in multiple ways without enforcing gender roles through targeting, for instance by highlighting the importance of the care economy that females tend to support. Providing women with cash is not enough to claim they are empowered.

B. Argument 2: Household welfare does not equate to female welfare

Targeting women within CCT’s has been claimed to have positive impact on the whole household, since women spend the money more wisely, specifically in the areas of health and education (Taukobong, 2016). However, this may not have the same results as expected on the women’s very own well-being. The responsibilities may burden women through increased expectations of how to perform in their gender roles when complying with conditionalities (Bradshaw, 2008).

In the case of Juntos, a Peruvian CCT, female-targeted transfers required mothers to organize their time and energy in such a manner to comply to certain health check-ups dependent on the age of the children or stage in pregnancy (MIDIS 2013b; Cookson, 2018). This was highly problematic because poor people would have more difficulties with accessing such services of quality. Especially for women in rural and poor infrastructure areas this was a larger burden than was anticipated within the program design. According to Cookson (2018), due to inaccessible and unreliable or unsafe public transport, women had to exuberate more time and energy on traveling far distances to comply with certain conditions such as accessing health services or bringing their children to school.

Conditionalities within CCT’s may not only result in physical burdens, as the women may have only limited time and energy considering their poor circumstances; it can also result in an emotional burden. As was discovered in the case of a Nicaraguan CCT called Red de Protección Social, the pressure was so high that certain women, who were not able to comply to the conditionalities and therefore could not be part of the program, were seen as ‘bad mothers’ within their communities (Bradshaw, 2008). Such implicit and negative side effects
could lead to social tensions and may have a detrimental consequence in the long-term development of gender equality.

In a sense, there is a strong contradiction when it comes to putting conditionalities on women beneficiaries within such CCT’s. If women’s spending behavior is supposedly ‘better’ than that of men, then why are there conditions attached to the benefit for women? Such targeted CCT’s are contradicting the goal of women empowerment if the conditions are in fact perpetuating gender inequality. Controlling what the desired behavior is through the conditionalities is a paternalistic mindset that may result in adverse outcomes in the long term.

**C. Argument 3: Social contracts need to be reassessed if social protection is considered a human right**

The second part to the so-called ‘conditionality argument’ is that such conditions can act as a means to build a social contract between the program and the beneficiaries (Yeboah et al., 2017). Social contract can be seen as a tool to appease political and social opinions especially in societies with prevailing inequalities and social hierarchies, since there is a need to make the benefit justifiable (Tessitore, 2011). Additionally, beneficiaries may prefer complying with certain conditions as to not feel as if being handed ‘charity’ and therefore lose certain parts of their agency (Yeboah et al, 2017). However, this specific mechanism of conditionalities becomes obsolete if we frame social protection as a basic human right, and not as a philanthropic endeavor that requires conditional transactions.

Framing social protection as a human right should result in placing woman in the middle of the discussion and designing the benefit around their social realities. An example is a CCT in Cairo, where the cash benefit program focused heavily in not only transferring money, but also transferring power to the female beneficiaries (Sholkamy, 2011). By promoting citizenship, women were empowered to understand and stand up for their basic human rights. Additionally, monitoring and evaluation processes were focused on women to give them opportunities to be responsible for their own development and the development of the program as a whole. Therefore, this process avoids the paternalistic top-down approach of monitoring and evaluating the beneficiaries without any real connection to the women’s reality.

Furthermore, social contracts could even evolve organically without having conditions in place. According to research done by Haarmann in Namibia (2009), on average most beneficiaries would behave in the same manner in an unconditional cash transfer and primarily spend the money on necessities for the household. What was even more outstanding was that
the community receiving the benefit organized themselves by setting up a committee to help decide how to spend the money in a wise manner. In this way, the burden was taken off the women’s shoulders and social contract was created from the bottom-up.

IV. CONCLUSION

At its core, there is nothing wrong with female-targeted cash transfers. It is even essential, because targeting cash benefit programs towards women is necessary to reduce poverty and improve income distribution, and can even empower this marginalized group. However, there are more layers to this issue that are deeply embedded in gender inequality that the CCT may not have the capacity to address in itself.

The complexities become apparent when conditionalities are introduced, especially when these CCT’s are not taking into account the intrahousehold dynamics and other infrastructural limitations that women may encounter. The real danger presents itself when programs fail to adequately recognize the inequalities that have permutated through social norms and impact capabilities of the women to comply by the program’s standards. Targeted CCT’s can even burden women by enforcing conditionalities that are perpetuating gendered stereotypes. Such programs are not sufficient for long-term empowerment and inclusion of women’s rights within society.

However, by taking an inclusive approach to targeted CCT’s, cash transfers can broaden the scope of the targets towards men. Examples of such can be found in promoting women empowerment within awareness programs for the whole household (Pawlack, 2013). It is necessary to emphasize the socially constructed gender roles and how this can be distorted within society. In this manner, understanding may be forged between both men and women on the importance of female independence and well-being.

Ultimately, a transformative approach of social protection, based on the concept of human rights, is necessary and needs to be reinforced as a means of redistributing both money and power across those experiencing inequality (Devereux, 2004). This approach embodies the human needs and capabilities, based on specific context, and takes a bottom-up approach to designing programs specifically for women.

Further research needs to be conducted on the impact of the bottom-up approach within program design for female-targeted CCT’s. It is essential to understand the impact for both women living under the poverty line and those of higher income but are at risk of falling into
poverty. This would not only lift the female beneficiaries out of poverty, but also ensure that those at risk are protected in the long term.

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**CONDITIONALITY IN FEMALE-TARGETED CCT’S**

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